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                                                                     ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
A Realization of Modernity: Case Studies in Connectivity and Time 
 
by 
 
Mari Gorman 
 
 
Advisor:  David Halle 
 
 
 
     My stated goal in applying to The Graduate Center was to explore my previous research in 
diverse fields of study. This research, the result of a formal investigation of acting, was and still 
is centrally focused on the subject of relationship itself, relationships being what actors create. In 
pursuit of a greater understanding of the essential nature of relationship in practical terms, 
“strokes of existence,” a self-organizing complex system that constitutes universal relationship, 
was unexpectedly discovered. As such, this system has been shown to offer solutions to many 
outstanding problems in diverse areas of study. The Liberal Studies program track, Approaches 
to Modernity, offered an ideal opportunity for me to further explore this work in different 
contexts because modernity has diverse meanings that span a multidisciplinary spectrum that 
includes history, philosophy, the arts and sciences, and religion. To reflect this effort, a different 
topic is addressed in each chapter, focusing on subjects that pertain to relationships in contexts of 
connectivity and time, for purposes of both contributing to the subject of modernity, and to add 
to the value of my work. 
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   INTRODUCTION 
 
The word "modern" comes from the Latin 
                “modernus” from modo: now, just now, only. 
 
 
     Originally a Western concept, modernity is now globally considered a measure of the state of 
a civilization. On the other hand, a view of postmodernism is that modernity is an essentially 
failed concept, or at least one that has had its day. So, the question inevitably becomes, What is 
modernity? 
Modernity comes in as many versions as there are thinkers or journalists, yet all its 
definitions point, in one way or another, to the passage of time. The adjective “modern” 
designates a new regime, an acceleration, a rupture, a revolution in time. When the word, 
“modern”, “modernization”, or “modernity” appears, we are defining, by contrast, an 
archaic and stable past.  Furthermore, the word is always being thrown into the middle of a 
fight, in a quarrel where there are winners and losers, Ancients and Moderns.1 
       “Ancients and Moderns” refers to a so-called “Quarrel Between the Ancients and Moderns,” 
a controversy that arose toward the end of the 17th century over which was superior, the 
scholarship of the new, modern culture, or those of ancient Greece and Rome. This “quarrel” was 
satirized by Jonathan Swift in 1697 in “The Battle of the Books,” in which he brings books in a 
                                                
1      Bruno Latour and Catherine Porter, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993), 10. 
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library to life to enact a battle between the Ancients and Moderns. He leaves the decision to the 
reader. To me, the inference is that they are essentially one and that the battle will kill them.2 
      Historically, the Moderns gained the upper hand. The developments during the Scientific 
Revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries bolstered the view of modern culture as superior in 
constituting change, while the culture of the ancients remained static. As Latour points out, the 
dichotomy persists, inviting the idea that the realization of modernity lies in the connection of 
science and the humanities. In the succeeding centuries, with all the meanings it has gained, the 
concept of modernity can be seen as so compelling that history has refused to let it go, and 
fortunately it hasn’t, or can’t, because of course history has a place in the present too. 
     In 1974, I embarked on a formal investigation of acting that led to the discovery of a self-
organizing complex system in which, among other things, past, present, and future are 
aggregated in the present moment, which makes it pertinent to the subject of modernity. With 
modernity in mind, I have pursued subjects in my coursework with meanings that pertain to 
connectivity and time, the interconnection of all things being the conclusion of relationship that 
the system bears out.  
     The story of this investigation and the self-organizing complex system it revealed are 
conveyed in my book, Strokes of Existence: The Connection of All Things. The word “strokes,” 
which is what the system is called, both for short and in its use, is borrowed from painting. In its 
operation, each stroke both adds to and changes a life, just as each stroke of a brush both adds to 
and changes a picture.3  
                                                
2      Jonathan Swift, “The Battle of the Books and Other Short Pieces” (1697), edited by Henry 
Morley (1886). Project Gutenberg eBook: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/623/623-h/623-h.htm 
3      Mari Gorman, "Strokes of Existence: The Connection of All Things" (2007), 12. 
 CUNY Academic Works. http://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_studentpubs/6 
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CHAPTER ONE  
 
Part I 
 
Global Connectivity 
 
 
 Diversity is the proof of life.4 
 
                                                                            --Daisaku Ikeda 
 
 
      The British cultural sociologist John Tomlinson offers the term “complex connectivity” for a 
way of understanding globalization, which he calls  an “empirical condition of the modern 
world,” and “an ever-densening network of interconnections.”5 He cites others who have also 
conceived of globalization in terms of connectivity, which includes: all the networks and flows6 
of “goods, capital, people, knowledge, images, crime, pollutants, drugs, fashions and beliefs, [as 
well as] social movements and relationships”7 which require the use of all types of transportation 
and communications systems.8 He explains that “culture matters for globalization in the obvious 
sense that it is an intrinsic aspect of the whole process of complex connectivity,” but that culture 
can furthermore be understood as being “constitutive” of complex connectivity.9  “Roots and 
                                                
4       Daisaku Ikeda and Majid Tehranian, Global civilization: a Buddhist-Islamic 
dialogue (London: British Academic Press, 2008), 25. 
5      John Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 2. 
6      Scott Lash, “Reflexivity and its doubles,” in Reflexive Modernization: Structure, Ethics, 
Community, Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash (Stanford CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1994), 110-73; Scott Lash and John Urry, Economies of Signs and Space (London: SAGE 
Publications, 2002); Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society; The Power of Identity; 
End of the Millennium (The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volumes I, II, and 
III) (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996, 1997, 1998).  
7     Anthony McGrew “A Global Society?” In Modernity and its Futures, Book IV, Stuart Hall, 
David Held, and Anthony G. McGrew, eds.(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 65, 67. 
8     Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture, 2. 
9     Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture, 22-26 
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routes”10 are always co-existent in culture, both being subject to transformation in global 
modernity.  How we understand culture as being constitutive of globalization depends our view 
of its consequences.11  For example, we now experience distance differently, and to illustrate 
this, Tomlinson compares airplanes to time capsules, because “when we board them we enter a 
self-contained and independent temporal regime” where our focus is on the familiar routine of 
in-flight beverages, meals, in-flight movie, etc., that take place in the cabin, and thus “our 
journey is one through time rather than space.” Passengers rarely even maintain an awareness of 
the topological changes they are passing over which are markers of distance. Disembarking after 
such a trip, one experiences what Tomlinson calls “a temporary dislocation” and a “reality of 
otherness” that challenges one to immediately adjust. The phenomenon of proximity also relates 
to “the correlation between income and mobility” because those who stay in one place also 
experience “the ‘dis-placement’ brought to them. One measure of the accomplishment of 
globalization,” he writes, “is how far the overcoming of physical distance is matched by that of 
cultural distance.”12 
      Tomlinson asserts that “although the increasing ability to move—physically and 
representationally—between places is a highly significant mode of connectivity,” it is 
“ultimately subordinate to—ultimately derivative of—the order of location in time and space we 
grasp as “home”. This means that the most important determinants of people’s experience of 
globalization is the “dis-placement that global modernity brings to them,”13 making global 
connectivity a local challenge, to be met by individuals. The peace builder, Buddhist 
                                                
10        James Clifford, Roots: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 3. 
11      Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture, 22-26 
12      Ibid., 4. 
13      Ibid., 9 (emphasis in the original). 
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philosopher, educator and author, Daisaku Ikeda, has said, “Inter-civilizational dialogue is 
currently the focus of attention, but the point of departure or the prototype is human-to-human 
rapport. The whole thing begins with one person talking with another.”14  
 
Part II 
                                                                 An Encounter 
          
      Simon McBirney is an innovative British theatre artist who, for the past 30 years, has created 
highly original productions with Complicite, the London theatre company he co-founded in 
1983. When I saw the ads for The Encounter, conceived, directed and performed by McBirney 
on Broadway, whose brilliant, highly original work I have seen in the past, I thought I must see 
this, especially given the long list of critics both in London and New York who awarded it five 
stars.  
      The Encounter, inspired by the book, Amazon Beaming by Petru Popescu, is a one-man show 
based on the National Geographic photographer Loren McIntyre’s real-life encounter with the 
“uncontacted” Mayoruna tribe of South America. I knew from the show’s promotional material 
that the aural component was the innovative feature of the show, but I wasn’t prepared for what 
this would mean until I experienced it.  
      When you get to your seat, you find a set of headphones draped over it. Audience members 
are repeatedly warned by a voice over a P.A. system that they must test their earphones before 
the show begins and to signal an usher if there is a problem, because if the headphones are not 
working correctly you will not be able to experience the show. With the stereo headphones on, 
                                                
14     Ikeda and Tehranian, Global Civilization, 9.    
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one hears a voice testing one ear and then the other: “You should be hearing the sound in your 
left ear now….and now in your right ear…”     
      The stage is fully lit before the show begins. The person who comes out to welcome the 
audience and ask people to shut off their cellphones continues talking and explaining and also 
demonstrating the sound equipment on stage, and the sound effects they can produce, and by that 
time you know it’s McBirney, and then suddenly he is no longer speaking from the stage but 
inside your head through your headphones, which he retests by going back and forth from one 
side to the other, through the “2.6 pounds of congealed pate” of your brain. He then does a trick 
of breathing sexily into your ear, and it really does sound like he is actually doing that. Then he 
tells us that a voice might come from the seat behind us, and as he says this his voice comes from     
there.  
      Continuing to banter while setting up props around the stage, McBirney starts dropping hints 
about where we’re headed. He finally sits down at a sort of console table and, giving a cue to a 
sound technician, demonstrates how the artificial lowering of his voice by an octave, combined 
with a change from a British accent to an American one, enables him to sound like a completely 
different person—in this case like a strong American male--who, he tells us, is Loren McIntyre. 
Speaking as McIntyre, the journey begins. This was quite a brilliant beginning.   
     It wasn’t very long after the show began that I started to feel uncomfortable in a way that 
gave me no hint that it might have an aesthetic source. What I felt was a kind of disconnect 
occurring as a result of seeing the character many yards away while at the same time hearing him 
in my head. When he is finally introduced to the Chief of the tribe, who is quite cordial to him, 
McIntyre notices that he has numerous growths on his legs, large moles or warts, and from then 
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on refers to him as “Barnacle.” This came as a shock and reduced McIntyre from a curious 
National Geographic photographer to a person of no interest at all to me.  
      Of course we never hear or see anyone else, only McIntyre. We only imagine others from 
what McIntyre says about them as he moves about the stage, sometimes using cleverly conceived 
props in front of changing backdrops with geometric designs composed of light, often 
accompanied by strange jungle kinds of sounds.  
      It wasn’t too long before I started thinking that the narrative of McIntyre’s experience would 
have been better served with just a podcast because my imagination would have had free rein. At 
a certain point during the play one hears a sort of background noise of some scientists discussing 
things like the relationship between perception and reality, which I wanted to actually hear, but it 
was somehow obscured. As the play wore on, I began to resent the experience I was having 
because it seemed to be entirely anti-theatre. Theatre is a live medium, and it is endangered in 
part because of new, invasive technologies. It is a medium in which life-to-life communication is 
itself the art form. Wearing headphones, I felt shut out somehow from the theatre itself; I was 
disconnected from the person I was watching because he sounded like he was inside my head, 
and thus these two perceptual senses were disconnected. With the headphones I was also 
completely cut off from others in the audience--even from the person sitting right next to me. 
When the show was over I actually felt like I hadn’t had a theatre experience at all, and even felt 
that the production was an insult to the theatre, which is, arguably, all about connectivity. 
      I didn’t fully appreciate until reading Tomlinson how The Encounter is about globalization 
and culture. In McBirney’s conception, an encounter with a tribe of the “uncontacted” brings an 
experience of complex dis-connectivity. Viewed in light of Tomlinson’s aforementioned 
statement that “the measure of the accomplishment of globalization is how far the overcoming of 
             8
physical distance is matched by that of cultural distance,” McBirney’s play is an apt metaphor 
for how far we have yet to go. As I saw the listings showing the declining numbers of seats sold 
for The Encounter over the next several weeks, it seemed the experience was also disappointing 
to others; complex dis-connectivity is no fun. Which is a good thing. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Entanglement Theory in Archaeology 
 
      In archaeology and throughout the social sciences there has in recent years been a growing 
interest in understanding human behavior from a more object, or “thing” centered point of view, 
a growing interest in the nature and role of “things” in relationships between people and things.1 
This case study is based on the Entanglement Theory of Ian Hodder, in which the connections 
between humans and things are explained in terms of use and dependence.   
      Traditionally, subject-object relationships (i.e., “human-thing” relationships), are considered 
to be produced solely through the agency of the subject, with the object generally considered a 
passive, subordinate, even dead sort of thing. This unbalanced relational concept has increasingly 
been seen as seriously lacking by archeologists, whose work is the study of material culture,15 16   
and by other social scientists who see it as an underlying cause even of unethical human 
behavior.17 18  Compelled by the thought that “Different perspectives and discussions of the 
agency, vibrancy and vitality of mute things have converged on some version of the idea that 
subject and object, mind and matter, human and thing co-constitute each other,” 19  Hodder 
                                                
15     Ian Hodder, ed. Archaeological Theory Today, 2nd edition (Maiden, MA: Polity Press, 
2012), 1-11.  
16     Vincent M. LaMotta, “Behavioral Archaeology.” In Archaeological Theory Today, 2nd 
edition (Maiden, MA: Polity Press, 2012), 62-82.  
17     Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2010) viii.  
18      Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 51. 
19      Bennett, Vibrant Matter; Latour, Reassembling the Social; A. Gell, “Vogel’s Net: traps as 
artworks and artworks as traps,” Journal of Material Culture,1(1), 15-38; Tim Ingold, Making: 
Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and Architecture (London: Routledge, 2013); Daniel Miller, 
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developed Entanglement Theory.20 He has written about this theory in Entangled: An 
Archaeology of the Relationships between Humans and Things, and in journal articles. The 
central argument of the theory is that the understanding of the interrelationships of humans and 
things is key to understanding human history and culture. 
       Hodder defines things (or objects) as entities, but states that because of the “connectiveness” 
of things, questions arise as to what the boundaries between entities are, and what makes a thing 
a “bounded essence.” Using his computer as an example, he asks if the computer is “just the 
unplugged processor box or is it also the connections that allow it to work?”  His conclusion is 
that the definition of an entity “depends on its use as a thing.” Thus his computer is not only the 
processor box but also its wires and screen and so forth—they are all necessary for it to work and 
thus for him to use as a computer. If he couldn’t use it he would have to get it fixed and in that 
process the different parts would then be “defined as separate entities depending on use.”21   
       Entanglement Theory approaches human-thing relationships from “the point of view of 
things,” and these relationships are defined as “entanglements.”  In this theory the idea that the 
human and social come first is dismissed, along with the idea that things are constructed by 
people and only exist for humans’ use.  Leveling the playing field, Hodder also describes 
humans as things, as “just temporary bundles of matter, energy and information,” and as “flows 
of blood and nerves and cells temporarily coalesced into an entity that is thoroughly dependent 
on and connected to air, water, food and so on.”22  Given this definition and adding an internet 
                                                
Stuff (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010); John C. Ryan and Alan T. Durning, Stuff: The Secret 
Lives of Everyday Things (Seattle: Sightline Institute, 1997); 
20      Hodder, Archaeological Theory Today, 1. 
21      Ian Hodder, Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships Between People and Things, 
Wiley-Blackwell, Maiden, MA, 2012 
22      Ibid., 9. 
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connection to it as Hodder does to his example of the computer, a human is also a complex 
“thing” with potentially infinite connections to other things.  And like the computer, if something 
goes wrong in the human, the part that needs to be fixed will be defined as a separate entity. 
Thus a person’s heart, which is also a thing, would be described separately, with all of its own 
uses and dependencies.  Hodder outlines various types of these connections between things, 
which are also considered interactions.23 
Forms of Connections between Things 
Production and Reproduction – Production processes link all the things needed to procure and 
manufacture things, and the locations and knowledge to do so, e.g., the assembly for making iron 
includes “furnace, fuel, fire, bellows, ore, tongs, hammer, cooling water, and so on.” The process 
of reproduction links humans to each other, as it does plants and animals. Reproduction also 
includes agricultural field preparation, protection of animals, and human birth.24  
Exchange – Gifts both given and received create links between things.  
Use – Things come into relation with other things as they are used, consumed or applied. This 
process is explained by the example of a steel hammer head that “needs a wooden handle if it is 
to be used, and the handle will only stay attached if a metal or wooden wedge is used. Then there 
are the nails and the wooden planks to be nailed, and the crossbeams to which they are to be 
nailed and so on”25 
Consumption – The form of use that involves dishes and foods involved in a meal as well as the 
consumption of social behavior in the form of imitation.  
                                                
23      M.B. Schiffer, The Material Life of Human Beings: Artifacts, Behavior, Communication 
(New York: Routledge, 1999). 
24      Hodder, Entangled, 43. 
25      Ibid. 
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Discard – Things are associated as they move through their life cycles and become mixed in 
middens and landfills.26 
Dependencies 
       Hodder defines entanglement as “the sum of four types of relationships between humans and 
things:   Humans depend on things (HT), things depend on other things (TT), things depend on 
humans (TH), humans depend on humans HH).”27 28 He also describes two types of dependence. 
One, which is enabling, “allows people to live, socialize, eat and think.”29 The other is 
‘entrapping’, as in co-dependent relationships or addictions, or dependencies that can hinder 
one’s development or increase the difficulties of living.  
       In explaining “humans depend on things,” Hodder cites food, water, and all the things that 
people depend on to live, work and enjoy life. He also describes humans as going towards and 
away from things, to both associate with them and also to disassociate, to ‘be their own thing.’”30  
       In explaining “things depend on other things,” Hodder describes a behavioral chain, which is 
“a progression of a series of interactions” between things. They are: “Procurement, Manufacture, 
Use, Maintenance, Repair, Discard.”  To explain these, he cites an example in which the 
procurement of a certain material for the manufacture of something requires a certain kind of 
tool. (55-56).  In turn, the use of the manufactured thing requires quality materials in order to be 
maintained, tools or materials to repair it during its inevitable process of decay, and a place to 
discard it.  Furthermore, interactions occur within behavioral chains that constitute the 
                                                
26      Ibid.  
27      Ibid. 
28      Ian Hodder, "The Entanglements of Humans and Things: A Long-Term View." New 
Literary History 45, no. 1 (2014), 19-36.  DOI: 10.1353/nlh.2014.0005  
29      Hodder, "The Entanglements of Humans and Things,” 1. 
30      Hodder, Entangled, 22. 
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‘performance’ of a thing, which relates to a certain task or objective. For example, a cooking pot 
must be tempered so that it can be repeatedly subjected to high heat without cracking.  With the 
ability to provide this kind of performance, the pot can contribute to human living.  
      “Things depend on humans” to procure, manufacture and fix them, as well as make use of, 
maintain, repair and discard them.  He says that if the obvious is added that “humans depend on 
humans, then entanglement is simply the addition of these four sets of dependences and 
dependencies.”31     
HT + TT + TH + HH = Entanglement 
      A cell phone is a good example of this formula.  Humans depend on cell phones, as everyone 
knows, for many different reasons (HT).  Cell phones require batteries that need to be recharged, 
making them dependent on a connective wire and a source of electricity (TT).  In order to remain 
in use, cell phones depend on humans to make bill payments to telecom companies (TH).  
Humans depend on Humans to produce, maintain, distribute and discard cell phones (HH).  
These complex connections between humans and cell phones are ‘entanglements’.       
       When a cell phone breaks for some reason or is lost, one who has grown dependent on her 
cell phone to communicate with family, friends, employers or employees, emergency services 
and in fact her world, will find herself at a tremendous loss without her cell phone.  Many 
problems can result from the loss of the connections a cell phone provides when one has become 
dependent on it to manage one’s life.  Hodder explains, “As humans increasingly live in a world 
they have produced, they have to work harder to reproduce that world on which they depend.”  
People have to purchase cell phones and service plans, which requires them to work or otherwise 
do something in order to gain the money to both pay for and support them; handle the 
                                                
31      Ibid., 88 
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transmission of such payments, keep the cell phone charged and in working order, and protect it. 
So although a cell phone can extend the capacity of one’s life, it also entraps. A basic argument 
of Entanglement Theory is that humans and societies are entrapped into the maintenance and 
sustaining of material worlds, which become more complex over time, and thus things can be 
said to have agency: “There is an objectness, a stand-in-the-wayness to things that resists, that 
forms, that entraps and entangles.”32  
      Although, as Hodder says, aspects of his theory regarding relationships between humans and 
things are in some ways in line with other approaches in the social sciences and humanities, there 
are, according to Hodder, two aspects of entanglement that have specific, archaeological, 
dimensions.33  One is “the physical processes of things”, and the other, “temporalities”.  
      Regarding physical processes, entanglement focuses on the physical processes of things in 
themselves.  The example Hodder gives is that of a see-through letter box he once noticed at 
Heathrow airport.  It was different from the red and cast iron ones that are common in England, 
which are designed to keep posted letters safe, private, and dry. The one in the airport was plastic 
and had a red front but was transparent in the back. Hodder describes this post box as being 
caught in an entanglement with the Pentagon because the box was introduced after 9/11 when the 
planes flew into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. The box was transparent on one side in 
order to be able to see if there was a bomb in it.  Running though this entanglement, he explains, 
is a climate of fear.34 It seems that from an archaeological perspective one can take from this that 
an investigation of the entanglements of a material object can lead to an understanding of its 
history and culture. 
                                                
32      Ibid., 13. 
33      Ibid., 97. 
34      Ibid., 96. 
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       “Temporalities”, the other component of Entanglement Theory that Hodder states has a 
specific archaeological dimension, concerns time in various contexts.  Time span is one. A firing 
in the brain is momentary, but a mountain endures over a great length of time. A stone building 
will last for a longer period of time than a wooden one.35 Another is linear time.  One can ride a 
bike or drive a car today because in the 4th millennium BC the wheel was invented.  Yet another 
is the ability to keep time. It is possible to determine and mark distances in time, in minutes or 
centuries for example, because of global systems of time keeping.  Hodder also goes into 
political, economic and religious contexts of time, and suggests, for example, the implications of 
such things as the build-up of refuse over time, which will create problems for future 
generations.36 
      Hodder does not believe that things have intentionality, but says that “things have primary 
agency in that they act in the world as a result of processes of material interaction, 
transformation and decay. Materials and the forces that flow through them afford humans certain 
potentials and constraints. In these ways things are actors.”37 
      Many of the examples Hodder conveys of entanglement theory relating to evidence from 
specific archaeological projects, are from the Neolithic settlement, Catalhöyük, a project which 
Hodder has led since 1993.  It is on the Kony Plain in central Turkey.  It has two mounds, one of 
which contains 18 occupation levels inhabited over a span of 1,400 years. The settlement, which 
was occupied for about 2,000 years, began approximately 9,400 years ago.38  The project is 
revealing information about the development of one of the world’s earliest societies, which 
                                                
35      Ibid., 5 
36      Ibid., 98-100. 
37      Ibid., 215-216. 
38     Management Plan of Neolithic Site of Çatalhöyük (May 2013). 
http://www.Catalhoyuk.Com/Sites/Default/Files/Catal_SMP_EN_Revised.Pdf, 9. 
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includes the social and economic organization of the settlement, and the transformation from 
hunting and gathering to agriculture and civilization.”39 
      One example of a discovery at this settlement involves the “Neolithic entanglement with 
clay.” 40 In the earliest levels, around 7400 cal BC, fired clay objects have been found.  Fired 
clay pottery, however, begins at Level XII, around 7000-6900 cal BC, but evidence suggests that 
the small, thick vessels were not used over a fire for cooking. Up to Level VII it seems food was 
cooked by putting heated clay balls into wood or clay baskets with the food.41  These clay balls 
go into disuse around Level VII and are replaced around the same time by thin-walled, mineral- 
tempered clay pots that show evidence of being used in cooking.  These mineral-tempered pots 
also have a greater capacity and, as shown by experiments in behavioral archaeology, have a 
greater efficiency of heat transfer than organic-tempered pots.  
      Using ethnographic and experimental data, the difference between cooking in clay pots over 
a fire and cooking with clay balls was that by cooking over a fire it was possible to do other 
things because the pot could be left alone on the fire. When the cooking was done with clay 
balls, the balls had to be moved in and out of the fire in order to be reheated when they cooled.  
Interestingly, the archaeological evidence indicates that during the Level VII and VI periods, the 
settlement was at its largest and was packed with houses. It was the custom of the inhabitants of 
this settlement to bury the deceased beneath their houses, and burial rituals within the houses 
                                                
39     http://www.ian-hodder.com 
40     Hodder, Entangled, 152. 
41     Sonya Atalay, “Domesticating Clay: the Role of Clay Balls, Mini Balls and Geometric 
Objects in Daily Life at Catalhöyük,” 2005, In “Changing Materialities at Catalhöyük: Reports 
from the 1995-99 Seasons,” edited by Ian Hodder. Çatalhöyük Project Volume 5, McDonald 
Institute Monographs/British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara (Cambridge, UK: McDonald 
Institute for Archaeological Research, 2006), 139-68. 
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increased. [With] “more going on in the houses and more pressure on available resources,” the 
change in human-thing entanglement was an adaptation to materials that allowed for multi-
tasking, less cooking time, and less use of fuel.42 This example supports Hodder’s entanglement 
theory in light of the claim by Rabb and Goodyear, conveyed by Schiffler in The Structure of 
Archeological Theory, that “only principles capable of explaining cultural behavior are real 
theory; all else is methodology.”43 
      Looking for an archaeological example of human-thing dependence that would indicate the 
depth of the interconnectedness of people and things that I have discovered in my work, I found 
one that is significant in Graecia Capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece, by Susan E. Alcock, 
on ramifications of the Roman conquest on provincial Greece. In it, Alcott explores four 
different “landscapes” in Graecia Capta: rural, civic, provincial, and sacred. The example I 
found is from “The sacred landscape.”   
      During the conquest of Greece and in its aftermath, the Romans destroyed or displaced cult 
objects and sanctuaries that were sacred to the Greeks. Augustus himself took objects from the 
sanctuary of Athena Alea at Tegea in Arcadia for removal to Rome.  Alcott refers to these acts as 
“symbolic violence.”44  She writes of the innumerable statues removed from Greek cities and 
sanctuaries as “plunder by Roman troops or by greedy emperors.”  Mainly she makes the point 
that the cult statues and votive—offerings—destroyed or displaced by the Romans were not 
simply art objects (as we might see them as in a museum today), but were “sacred things [that] 
                                                
42      Hodder, Entangled, 153. 
43      L. Mark Rabb and Albert C. Goodyear, “Middle-Range Theory in Archaeology: A Critical 
Review of Origins and Applications,” American Antiquity, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 255-
268, In Schiffer, Michael B., “The Structure of Archaeological Theory” American Antiquity, Vol 
53, No. 3 (July 1988) 461-485 
44      Susan E. Alcock, Graecia Capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993).  
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contained and declared the history and identity of individual civic entities as well as the Greeks 
as a whole.”45 Alcott states that the Romans’ consciousness of what they were taking cannot be 
denied. “Depriving one’s enemy of sacred objects and possessing them yourself served two 
related purposes: defeating them in perpetuity and adding the power of their gods to your own 
symbolic arsenal.”46  “…the action removed their gods.”47  Most dangerously, Alcott states, is 
that “such acts worked effectively to undermine local loyalties, to shatter established 
relationships of authority, and, above all, to weaken any pretense of independence.48 This is an 
example of how the loss of the things in which a community places their faith (i.e., values most 
highly and depends on most) for the happiness and security of their community, would leave 
them rudderless and have a disintegrating effect, which indeed was the outcome of the Roman 
capture of Greece.  This is not simply a general observation of an outcome. The effect of the 
destruction of what they most valued had to have profoundly impacted their lives, both 
physically and spiritually. The reason is that human beings are literally composed of their values.       
     The self-organizing complex system called “strokes,” systematically produces relationships, 
and in so doing constitutes the inseparability of mind and body and person and environment. In 
the system, the component of subjectivity is most important because it encompasses one’s values, 
and therefore one’s attitudes towards everything.49  This principal, stated by Daisaku Ikeda in a 
dialogue with Arnold Toynbee, is that “The nature of the thing on which a man places greatest 
                                                
45      Ibid., 178. 
46      Ibid., 177. 
47      R. L. Gordon, “The Real and Imaginary: Production and Religion in the Graeco-Roman 
World.” Art History 2, no. 1 (1979), 5-34.  DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8365.1979.tb00031.x  
48      Alcock, Graecia Capta, 179-180. 
49      Gorman, "Strokes of Existence,” 16-17. 
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value characterizes that man’s attitude toward all life.”50  Because of the oneness of mind, body, 
person and environment, this attitude manifests in all one’s relationships, in every aspect of one’s 
life. An example of this is conveyed in Strokes of Existence: The Connection of All Things: “A 
person whose motorcycle is at the center of his life, who values his motorcycle above all else, 
will likely take on the aspects of a motorcycle, attiring himself in such things as a black leather 
jacket with chrome studs, and mirrored glasses. He will also value a high degree of freedom and 
like to get around things.”51 What people value manifests both physically and spiritually on deep 
levels, and finds expression in their appearance and behavior.  Evidence of this principle can be 
extraordinarily specific. 
 
          Figs. 1, 2, 3.52    
     In the combined images above, the praying woman, as shown by her hat (called a “steeple 
                                                
50      Arnold Toynbee and Daisaku Ikeda, Choose Life: A Dialogue, edited by Richard L. Gage. 
(Oxford University Press: 1976), 367-368. (This dialogue was carried out across 10 days in 1972 
and 1973, totaling more than 40 hours.)  
51      Gorman, “Strokes of Existence,” 17. 
52      Fig. 1: detail of Image: The Coronation of Charlemagne (800 AD)  Public Domain 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Charlemagne_coronation.jpgdetail  
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hat”), as well as by her position, is devoted to the church. The men, with their headwear 
reflecting subordinate levels of the church building itself, are devoted servants of the church, and 
are shown performing a ceremony in this relationship, which also indicates the power of the 
church. 
     The process through which this oneness of people and things is achieved is a process through 
which evolution occurs and culture is propagated.53 This system, discussed above, empirically 
realizes “the idea that subject and object, mind and matter, human and thing co-constitute each 
other.”54 
     As explained in Hodder’s entanglement theory and further exemplified above, an 
understanding of the interrelationships of humans and things in terms of dependence does 
enhance the ability to understand human history and culture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
         Fig. 2: Wenceslaus Hollar,  Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons. 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wenceslas_Hollar_-_Salisbury_Cathedral_(State_2).jpg 
         Fig. 3: detail of Image:Meister des Jouvenel des Ursins.jpg  Public Domain. 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Meister_des_Jouvenel_des_Ursins_001_detail_1.jpg#file 
53      Gorman, “Strokes of Existence,” 29. 
54      Ibid., 22. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Makiguchi: Bridging the Narrative Divide 
 
      Narrative psychology, a subfield of psychology, is based on the premise that people 
understand, think about, and explain their lives in storied form.1 The narrative approach to  
psychology is inspiring because everyone understands what a story is—even children can tell 
stories from two and a half to three years old.55 Despite the simplicity of the concept, however, it 
is a vast subject, approached from many perspectives. 
      Notwithstanding the differences between these perspectives, a shared idea in the field of 
narrative psychology is that we are each living a story of our own making, and by changing our 
stories we can change our lives.  Another is that lived experience can only be described in 
narrative form.  
     Jerome Bruner, one of the founders of narrative psychology, wrote in an early paper on the 
subject that 
The mimesis between life so-called and narrative is a two-way affair: that is to say, just as art 
imitates life in Aristotle's sense, so, in Oscar Wilde's, life imitates art. Narrative imitates life, 
life imitates narrative. "Life" in this sense is the same kind of construction of the human 
imagination as "a narrative" is. It is constructed by human beings through active ratiocination, 
by the same kind of ratiocination through which we construct narratives. When somebody 
tells you his life…it is always a cognitive achievement rather than a through-the-clear-crystal 
                                                
55      Brian Sutton-Smith, “Children’s Fiction Making” In Narrative Psychology: The Storied 
Nature of Human Conduct, Edited by Theodore R. Sarbin. (New York: Praeger), 74.  
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recital of something univocally given. In the end, it is a narrative achievement. There is no 
such thing psychologically as "life itself."56  
     Based on the evidence of the self-organizing complex system called strokes, already noted in 
this thesis, in which life manifests itself in the form of relationships, I argue that there is such a 
thing as “life itself.” By this I mean that both the living of life and the narrative telling of it are 
both productions of the same intrinsic process.  
     In an article published nearly forty years before he wrote the above, Bruner, who was also a 
founder of cognitive psychology, stated that in its understanding of perception, the practice of 
psychology was still lacking. Quoting L. L. Thurstone, he wrote: ‘“In these days when we insist 
so frequently on the interdependence of all aspects of personality, it would be difficult to 
maintain that any of these functions, such as perception, is isolated from the rest of the 
dynamical system that constitutes the person.”’57 Following this quote, Bruner states, “The 
problem is, indeed, to understand how the process of perception is affected by other concurrent 
mental functions and how these functions, in their turn, are affected by the operation of 
perceptual processes.”58 It seems that when he wrote this he too believed that a dynamical system 
such as Thurstone described existed, and only needed to be discovered.  In 1986, Bruner turned 
to narrative psychology as the possible basis of such a system. However, in 2002, a “dynamical 
system that constitutes the person” in the context of a narrative self was deemed impossible by 
                                                
56      Bruner, Jerome, “Life as Narrative” Social Research, 54, no. 1 (1987), 692-693. 
        http://www.jstor.org/stable/40970444 
57      L. L. Thurstone, A Factorial Study of Perception, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1944), 74. Qtd. in Jerome Bruner, Beyond the Information Given: Studies in the Psychology of 
Knowing, selected, edited, and introduced by Jeremy M. Anglin. (New York: Norton, 1973), 44.  
58      Jerome Bruner and Cecile C. Goodman, “Value and Need as Organizing Factors in 
Perception.” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 42, No. 1 (1947), 33-34. In Jerome 
Bruner, Beyond the Information Given: Studies in the Psychology of Knowing, selected, edited, 
and introduced by Jeremy M. Anglin. (New York: Norton, 1973), 44. 
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Bruner.59 The problem he finally concluded was insurmountable is the one he identified at the 
beginning of his journey with narrative psychology: “There are two modes of cognitive 
functioning, two modes of thought, each providing distinctive ways of ordering experience, of 
constructing reality. The two (though complimentary) are irreducible to one another.”60  
     The two modes of thought Bruner describes are what he termed the “paradigmatic mode, or 
logico-scientific mode” (he chose to use only the word “paradigmatic”), and the other, the 
“narrative mode”:  
The paradigmatic mode “attempts to fulfill the ideal of a formal, mathematical system of 
description and explanation. It employs categorization or conceptualization and the 
operations by which categories are established, instantiated, idealized, and related one to the 
other to form a system. The imaginative application of the paradigmatic mode leads to good 
theory, tight analysis, logical proof, sound argument, and empirical discovery guided by 
reasoned hypothesis. ... The narrative mode leads instead to good stories, gripping drama, 
believable (though not necessarily "true") historical accounts. It deals in human or human-
like intention and action and the vicissitudes and consequences that mark their course.”61  
Thus, “the structure of a well-formed logical argument differs radically from that of a well-
wrought story.”62   
     Can the problem of the irreducibility of the “paradigmatic” and “narrative” modes of thought 
                                                
59      Jerome Bruner, Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2002), 101. 
60      Bruner, Jerome, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1986), 11. 
61      Ibid., 12-13. 
62      Ibid., 11. 
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ever be resolved so that they are reducible to each other and thereby enable a fully narrative self?  
Studying narrative psychology while having knowledge of the theory of value of the Japanese 
educator and geographer, Tsunesaburo Makiguchi (1871-1944), which gave me the foundation 
for my work, I realized that the problem had already been solved.  
     It is not possible to convey anything approaching the breadth of Makiguchi’s theory of value 
in this space. However, the following is a brief yet concise explanation of it by Daisaku Ikeda, 
who has built an entire school system, from kindergarden to university, based on Makiguchi’s 
Pedagogy: 
       Central to Makiguchi’s Pedagogy was his theory of value. In this schema, he modified the 
neo-Kantian value system of truth, goodness and beauty dominant in Japan at the time and 
reordered it as beauty, benefit (also translated as gain or utility) and goodness. He defined 
beauty as that which brings fulfillment to the aesthetic sensibility of the individual; benefit as 
that which advances the life of the individual in a holistic manner; goodness as that which 
contributes to the well-being of the larger human society.  
     Makiguchi removed “truth” from his list of values, seeing truth as essentially a matter of 
identification and correspondence; value, in contrast, is a measure of the subjective impact a 
thing or event has on our lives. While truth identifies an object’s essential qualities or 
properties, value may be considered the measure of the relevance or impact an object or 
event bears on the individual.63   
Quoting Makiguchi, he concludes: 
                                                
63      Daisaku Ikeda. Soka Education: For the Happiness of the Individual, Revised edition 
(Santa Monica, CA: Middleway Press, 2010), 15-16. 
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Value arises from the relationship between the evaluating subject and the object of 
evaluation. If either changes relative to the other, it is only obvious that the perceived 
value will change. The differences and shifts in ethical codes throughout history provide 
but one of the more outstanding proofs of the mutability of value.”64  
     Making his claim in regard to the two types of thought—in Bruner’s terminology, “the two 
modes of thought,” Makiguchi wrote: 
     Willhelm Wundt attempted to classify the operation of the mind into two elements—a 
single sense and a single feeling, but I would like to separate them into cognition and 
evaluation. That these two functions are not of different quality can be observed from the fact 
that all spiritual phenomena are but manifestations of the unity called life.65  
     And (excerpting parts of it here in support of the present argument pertaining to narrative 
psychology, and drawing from two other publications in English for brevity), he continues: 
There are two types of thinking: One is evaluation without cognition, and the other, cognition 
without evaluation.66 
The mental operation by which we know things intellectually is termed cognition. Evaluation, 
as the word implies, involves placing a value upon things or judging. As mental phenomena, 
both are but manifestations of the same unified psychology, related but not identical …The 
                                                
64      Dale M. Bethel, ed. Education for Creative Living: Ideas and Proposals of Tsunesaburo 
Makiguchi. Trans. Alfred Birnbaum (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1989), 61. Qtd. 
in Daisaku Ikeda. Soka Education: For the Happiness of the Individual. Revised edition (Santa 
Monica, CA: Middleway Press, 2010), 15-16. 
65      Tsunesaburo Makiguchi. Philosophy of Value. Revised and augmented by Josei Toda (1953). 
Trans. Overseas Bureau (Tokyo: Seikyo Press, 1964), 27. 
66      Ibid., 33. 
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perception of the thing among things is objective, and evaluation, the perception of the thing 
in relation to the self, is subjective.67  
Makiguchi explains that these two processes of cognition and evaluation are  
“in continual interplay, but as a careful consideration of our daily life will show, there are 
three predominant patterns by which we deal with the phenomena of our living environment: 
we may make evaluations after having reached a thorough cognition, attempt cognition only 
after our evaluations, or evaluate things without any definite cognition at all.68 
      Though difficult for me to grasp at first, Makiguchi’s explication of subject-object 
relationships became a crucial part of my work to understand relationships, which are what 
actors create. My investigation was unusual in that it involved, among other things, the reverse 
engineering of a character I had recently played for many months, in which I had experienced 
magnetic interactions between internal physical components that I also experienced as being 
systematic.69 Importantly, Makiguchi’s explanations enabled me to identify and understand 
dynamics of relationship that I had experienced. Putting his explanations into practice helped 
me to understand them. Thus, on first reading Philosophy of Value, the word “force” in the 
following explanation was particularly encouraging:70 
                                                
67      Dale M. Bethel, ed., Education for Creative Living: Ideas and Proposals of Tsunesaburo 
Makiguchi. Trans.Alfred Birnbaum (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1989), 63. 
68      Ibid., 64. 
69      Gorman, “Strokes of Existence,” 4-7. 
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“Cognition means attending to an object, recognizing its quality and mentally receiving it as 
idea…On the other hand, evaluation is the measurement of relative force between object and 
subject. Therefore, cognition is objective and evaluation subjective.”71 
And also this: 
The expressions, “This is beautiful” or “This is ugly” mean that the man who has such a 
feeling has some subjective standard to criticize or evaluate the object and measures the 
relative force of the object by the quantity of the impression or an agreeable or disagreeable 
feeling. In this case, the truth or falsehood of the object is not relevant but the quantity of the 
influence of the object on the subject is the crux of the matter.72  
 
     Makiguchi’s concept of a “subjective standard” was also important because it explained and 
confirmed my own intuitive but unusual formulation of a character’s motivation. Through the 
reverse engineering of the character I played, I realized I had created the character’s desires as if 
they were already achieved, which is to say in the present tense, making them standards, or 
criteria, of evaluation.73 In the self-organizing complex system of strokes, subjectivity is the 
dynamic motivational component. A subjectivity, or whole subjectivity, is multi-faceted as it can 
consist of any number of subjectivities, which priorities can change. Subjectivity encompasses 
what one believes constitutes one’s happiness, and therefore includes one’s beliefs, desires, 
needs, objectives, intentions, motives, aims, drives, attitudes and points of view, to comprise 
one’s values and standard of values. We judge things on the basis of our subjectivity, which is 
                                                
71      Makiguchi, Philosophy of Value, 27. 
72      Ibid., 29. 
73      Gorman, Strokes of Existence, 4-5. 
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one’s ideal for one’s life in any moment.74 “What a person’s subjectivities are and what happens 
in light of them, is essentially the story of a person’s life.”75  
     The fact that as a standard the subjectivity as I embodied and experienced it worked 
empirically with Makiguchi’s formulation was important because it validated the presence of 
force. The primary reason for this, and most importantly, is that in Makiguchi’s formulation, the 
object of cognition is received first. With this, the basic operation of the mind becomes 
computational. With the two types of thought, one being the perception of an object as a thing 
among things, and the other an evaluation of the object relative to the self—the objective, 
scientific mode, and subjective, narrative mode—become reducible, each to the other, permitting 
a fully narrative self.  
            Using the primary components of relationship in Makiguchi’s formulation, the following 
examples are given to show how life itself is narrative, that there is such a thing psychologically 
as “life itself.”  
             Again, in Makiguchi’s words, “The perception of the thing among things is objective, and 
evaluation, the perception of the thing in relation to the self, is subjective.76  
       The following two examples are of an objective mode of thought (cognition without evaluation): 
Objectivity:      animals 
Subjectivity:     I understand animals 
Perception:         species-specific 
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75      Ibid., 18. 
76      Bethel, Education for Creative Living, 63. 
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Objectivity:      lion 
Subjectivity:     I understand animals 
Perception:         feline 
 
Subjective mode of thought (evaluation without cognition): 
Objectivity:      lion 
Subjectivity:     I understand animals 
Perception:         regal 
 
Objective mode: 
Objectivity:      the house  
Subjectivity:     we have a wonderful home 
Perception:         brick 
 
Subjective mode: 
Objectivity:     the house  
Subjectivity:     we have a wonderful home 
Perception:         comfortable 
 
Repeating one of Makiguchi’s statements: 
The expressions, “This is beautiful” or “This is ugly” mean that the man who has such a 
feeling has some subjective standard to criticize or evaluate the object and measures the 
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relative force of the object by the quantity of the impression or an agreeable or disagreeable 
feeling. In this case, the truth or falsehood of the object is not relevant but the quantity of the 
influence of the object on the subject is the crux of the matter.77  
For example: 
Objectivity:         the decorations 
Subjectivity:      The event is a success 
Perception:          beautiful 
Response:            relieved 
     
This is an example of what Makiguchi described as “evaluation without any definite 
cognition at all”:  
Objectivity:       the movie 
Subjectivity:      Joe loves me      
Perception:        great                   
Response:         loved 
In the example, the person sees the movie as great because Joe, the person s/he wants love from, 
sees it as great.  
     Makiguchi states that “people do tend to confuse cognition and evaluation. Hence we have 
doctors and lawyers who become unduly concerned with cutting a dapper, well-kept figure 
                                                
77      Ibid., 29. 
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because clients judge by appearances rather than inquiring into their actual abilities.”78 
     These examples show that it is the content, and not the form of relationship, that creates the 
division.   
     With his explication of the two types of thought, Makiguchi discovered how the scientific and 
narrative modes of thought are reducible to one another, which provides the field of narrative 
psychology with what Jerome Bruner determined it needed in order to become a full field of 
psychology. With these “mutually translatable worlds of mind,”79 Makiguchi also discovered the 
common ground of science and the humanities. Arguably, therefore, with the notion that it lies in 
this connection, he realized modernity; the modernity of equality and freedom in the present 
moment. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
78      Dale M. Bethel, ed., Education for Creative Living: Ideas and Proposals of Tsunesaburo 
Makiguchi. Translated by Alfred Birnbaum (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1989), 65. 
 
79 Bruner, Making Stories, 101. 
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    CHAPTER FOUR 
Film: Clothed in the Forms of Our Own Consciousness 
 
       The depth of the impression of reality that film produces in spectators has made the search 
for an understanding of the relationship between mental processes and the cinematic process a 
focus of film studies since the earliest days of film. Studying the history of early cinema, which 
spans the silent film era, seems in many ways the same as studying the social history of the same 
period. Is it because film, like theatre in Shakespeare’s words, “holds a mirror up to nature”? Or 
because early cinema was instrumental in the creation of that social history? I argue, with 
evidence, that the mental and cinematic process are essentially one and the same, and thus the 
answer is both.  
      In his foreword to the 1970 Dover reissue of Hugo Munsterberg’s 1916 book, The 
Photoplay: A Psychological Study, a book that had been forgotten and all but lost, the film 
historian and curator of the MoMA film library, Richard Griffith, wrote, “Everybody knows 
from his own experience that there is a sharp and specific analogy between the film forms 
which have been worked out since 1900 and the mental mechanism by which consciousness 
functions on all levels. Everybody knows this—but the knowledge has remained vague, 
mooney, nebulous.”80   
      Hugo Munsterberg (1863–1916) was a Harvard professor of psychology who today is 
considered a founder of the field of psychology of film. He drew a connection between the 
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mental processes of the spectator and processes of the cinema. José Moure describes 
Munsterberg’s “most original and important contribution to film theory”: 
 
  For the first time since the beginning of film as a medium, a study raised the problem 
of subjectivity in film and provided the foundations for what can be called in modern 
terms a spectator theory (the effectiveness of moving images is based on a 
psychological phenomenon that requires the mental cooperation of the spectator in 
order to achieve their full potential).”81    
      Miriam Hansen, in Babel and Babylon, claims that the “paradigm shift” between the 
inception of cinema (1895-1896) and classical Hollywood cinema (c1907), occurred as a result 
of “the emergence of the film spectator as a concept, a structural term,” and “above all, in the 
conception of the relations between film and spectator.”82 
     In Point of View in the Cinema, the film theorist Edward Branigan conveys a relational 
framework of film narration. He explains the narration of the text as “a hierarchal series of pairs 
of (nominal) subjects and objects” and says that “there is thus subjectivity in every narration, 
including the so-called ‘neutral’ shots of a film. In its widest sense, subjectivity refers to the 
perceptual context of every utterance within the text.”83 He identifies the subjectivities of the 
text as its author, narrator, characters and reader [spectator]. He also explains that the narrator of 
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the text—the omniscient narrator-- is actually the only narrator, the character narration being a 
means the narrator employs for the purpose of storytelling.  “Typically, there will be many 
narrations… and “the reader is also a subject in the scheme of narration/narrative… The reader 
is defined by the ability to frame all the divisions of the text, thus providing them with an 
apparent unity.”84  In a later chapter he states, “Subjectivity…may be conceived as a specific 
instance or level of narration where the telling is attributed to a character in the narrative and 
received by us as if we were in the situation of a character.”85  
     The silent film, “The Mothering Heart,” was directed D.W. Griffith, with Lillian Gish and 
Walter Miller in a story by Hazel H. Hubbard. It was a cautionary tale in 1913, when most 
women had few options other than marriage, and men preyed upon them for the housekeeping 
and other services they could provide for little cost as wives. It tells women that a good woman 
is a woman with a mothering spirit, but to beware of men who would take advantage of it. Below 
are selected screenshots from the opening scene of this film, with notations. A major purpose of 
the examples is to show that the mental processes of the spectator, the characters, and the 
omniscient narrator (which is the cinematic process), are the same. (So, by the way, is that of the 
bus driver who takes you to the movie theatre.)  
     With the screenshots and notations, I show that a film’s story is conveyed in the language of 
relationships, by all narrators. There are many more components involved in the moment to 
moment production of relationships; a stroke has 20 components.86 They all emerge, however, 
from the same primary components used in the examples in the previous chapter, which are also 
used here as a shorthand version of a whole stroke. 
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     The strokes component of catalyst is also included with the primary components in this 
chapter. The catalyst is what causes a change from one stroke to another. Catalysts have the 
same function in mental processes as edits do in the cinematic process. In a few of the notations 
of the narrations, the component of relative object is included, a relative object being something 
that has a bearing on the present relationship. There are always relative objects in a stroke, but 
for the purposes of this discussion they aren’t required, and therefore to avoid confusion they 
are only included where they would be felt to be missing if not noted. 
     The characters have no names in the film, and so just as people may have identified the 
characters when it was first shown, the actor’s own names are used.   
     As mentioned in the previous chapter, subjectivities are multifaceted. To state this another 
way, subjectivities have facets. In this scene, three facets of Lillian’s whole subjectivity are 
catalyzed. Each facet is a subjectivity in itself. Thus, in this scene, Lillian has three subjectivities.  
I’m a good person 
I enjoy life                      
Everything is normal 
      As will be shown, different catalysts bring out different of these subjectivities at different 
points in the scene. However, Lillian’s priority subjectivity is “I’m a good person.” If her 
subjectivity “I enjoy life” were her priority, meaning more important to her than being a good 
person, the story would be different, as would she, which would also be the case if “Everything 
is normal” were her priority subjectivity. This same principle is at work in all the narrations. If 
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desired, further explanations pertaining to the interoperation of subjectivities in the contexts of 
priorities and change can be found in Strokes of Existence.87 
      The notations of the response component in the omniscient narrator are sometimes missing 
because the creation of the perception of the person or event is its main purpose. When it is 
included, it is to further influence the response in the spectator.   
     I haven’t tried to attend to every moment of the scene with notations of the narratives, but  
 
rather to include enough to indicate the function of each of the narrators in the telling or  
 
receiving of the story. Also, needless to say, one may see things differently than I have. With  
 
film, as Hugo Munsterberg wrote: 
 
 
     The massive outer world has lost its weight, it has been freed from space, time, and   
    
     causality, and it has been clothed in the forms of our own consciousness. The mind has  
       
     triumphed over matter and the pictures roll on with the ease of musical tones.88 
 
 
Table 1: Screenshots from “The Mothering Heart,” with notations:89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 
 
 
 
Spectator: 
Catalyst:        see movie title 
Objectivity:   Lillian Gish 
Subjectivity:  I have a life 
Perception:    wonderful 
Response:      expectant 
                                                
87      Gorman, Strokes of Existence, 18. 
88      Hugo Münsterberg, The Photoplay: A Psychological Study (1916) (New York: D. Appleton 
and Co., 1916), 220.  
89     D.W. Griffith. “The Mothering Heart.” (2013) USA. Biograph Company. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JCmY6VQP6s4 
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  2 
Omniscient Narrator: 
Catalyst:        opening shot of Lillian 
Objectivity:   Lillian 
Subjectivity:  Lillian is special 
Perception:    luminous 
Lillian: 
Objectivity:   tree leaves 
Subjectivity:  I enjoy life 
Perception:    lovely 
Response:      admiring 
Spectator: 
Catalyst:        see Lillian 
Objectivity:   Lillian 
Subjectivity:  I enjoy life 
Perception:    lovely 
Response:      starry-eyed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
Lillian’s mother:  
Objectivity:   Lillian 
Subjectivity:  Lillian is happy 
Perception:    dawdling 
Response:      prodding  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
Lillian: 
Catalyst:        Mother’s prodding 
Objectivity:   the afternoon 
Subjectivity:  I enjoy life 
Perception:    pleasant  
Response:      enjoying 
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 5 
 
 
Lillian:                                                
Catalyst:        see something 
Objectivity:   something in garden 
Subjectivity:  Everything is normal 
Perception:    concerning  
Response:      alerted 
Spectator: 
Catalyst:        see Lillian’s change 
Objectivity:   something 
Subjectivity:  Everything is normal 
Perception:    concerned 
Response:      alerted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Omniscient Narrator: 
Catalyst:        Shot of puppies 
Objectivity:   puppies 
Subjectivity:  Puppies are adorable 
Perception:    mischievous 
Response:      amused 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
With intertitles, the omniscient narrator 
broadcasts what the next part of the 
story is about. 
. 
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 8 
 
Lillian 
Catalyst:        recognize that it’s puppies 
Objectivity:   puppies 
Subjectivty:   I enjoy life 
Perception:    mischievous 
Response:      amused  
  
Spectator 
Catalyst:        see Lillian’s expression 
Objectivity:   puppies 
Subjectivity:  I enjoy life 
Perception:    mischievous 
Response:      amused 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 
Omniscient Narrator: 
Catalyst:        Shot of puppies 
Objectivity:   puppies 
Subjectivity:  Puppies are like babies 
Perception:    helpless 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
Lillian: 
Catalyst:        see puppy’s head in can 
Objectivity:   puppy 
Subjectivity:  I’m a good person 
Perception:    helpless 
Response:      caring 
Spectator 
Catalyst:       see Lillian’s change 
Objectivity:   puppies 
Subjectivity:  I’m a good person 
Perception:    helpless 
Response:      caring 
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11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lillian  
Catalyst:         grip can 
Objectivity:    can removal 
Subjectivity:   I’m a good person 
Perception:     tricky 
Response:       careful 
Relative obj.   puppies 
Spectator: 
Catalyst:        see Lillian’s skirt in dirt  
Objectivity:   skirt 
Subjectivity:  I’m a good person 
Perception:    dirty 
Response:      worried 
[The spectator’s change of stroke upon seeing 
Lillian with her nice skirt in the dirt, is an 
example of how one’s own subjectivity, though 
supplanted during the course of watching a 
film, can still influence an internal personal 
narrative. In this case, seeing Lillian’s skirt in 
the dirt could cause her worry if her own 
subjectivity in life were something like, “I have 
what I need.” In the stroke here, given that she 
is in the situation of the character, the 
information she is internalizing is that being a 
good person can mean sacrificing something 
that is needed, worrying her. At the same time, 
she is internalizing the values of her idol.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
Lillian: 
Catalyst:        grasp both puppies  
Objectivity:   puppies  
Subjectivity:  I’m a good person 
Perception:    vulnerable 
Response:      motherly 
Spectator 
Catalyst:        see puppies in Lillian’s arms 
Objectivity:   puppies 
Subjectivity:  I’m a good person 
Perception:    vulnerable 
Response:      motherly 
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13 
 
Lillian  
Catalyst:        puppy pulls forward 
Objectivity:   the puppy 
Subjectivity:  I’m a good person 
Perception:    anxious 
Response:      soothing 
 
Spectator 
Catalyst:        see Lillian’s expression  
Objectivity:   the puppy 
Subjectivity:  I’m a good person 
Perception:    anxious 
Response:      soothing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Llllian: 
Catalyst:       see puppy’s nose    
Objectivity:  Puppy 
Subjectivity: I enjoy life 
Perception:   adorable 
Response:     happy 
 
Spectator 
Catalyst:        see Lillian and puppy 
Objectivity:   the puppy 
Subjectivity:  I enjoy life 
Perception:    adorable 
Response:      happy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
Omniscient Narrator 
Catalyst:         cut to Walter arriving 
Objectivity:    Walter 
Subjectivity:   Lillian is happy  
Perception:     aggressive 
 
Spectator: 
Catalyst:         see Walter arriving 
Objectivity:    Walter 
Subjectivity:   Lillian is happy 
Perception:     aggressive 
Response:       curious 
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16 
 
 
Walter: 
Catalyst:        sight of Lillian 
Objectivity:   Lillian  
Subjectivity:  I have what I want 
Perception:    beautiful 
Response:      taken aback 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
17 
Walter: 
Catalyst:        see Lillian 
Objectivity:   Lillian 
Subjectivity:  I have what I want 
Perception:    motherly 
Response:      inspired 
 
Spectator: 
Catalyst:        Walter’s expression 
Objectivity:   Lillian 
Subjectivity:  I have what I want 
Perception:    beautiful 
Response:      taken 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
Omniscient Narrator: 
Catalyst:        cut to Lillian 
Objectivity:   Lillian 
Subjectivity:  Lillian is a star  
Perception:    beautiful 
Response:      loving 
Lillian:  
Catalyst:        feel puppy against chest 
Objectivity:   puppy 
Subjectivity:  I’m a good person 
Perception:    defenseless 
Response:      loving 
Spectator: 
Catalyst:         see Lillian  
Objectivity:    Lillian 
Subjectivity:   I have a life 
Perception:     beautiful 
Response:       loving 
Relative obj.   Walter 
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19 
Omniscient Narrator: 
Catalyst:        Cut to Walter 
Objectivity:   Walter 
POV:             Lillian is happy 
Perception:    wrong 
Walter: 
Catalyst:        put on smile 
Objectivity:   Lillian 
Subjectivity:  I have what I want 
Perception:    ideal 
Response:      presenting (himself) 
Spectator 
Catalyst:        see Walter 
Objectivity:   Walter 
Subjectivity:  Lillian is happy 
Perception:    wrong 
Response:      curious 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
Lillian: 
Catalyst:        hear Walter say “Hello!” 
Objectivity:   Walter 
Subjectivity:  I enjoy life 
Perception:    arrived 
Response:      friendly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
Lillian: 
Catalyst:         Walter tickles puppy 
Objectivity:    Walter 
Subjectivity:   I enjoy life 
Perception:     enjoying 
Response:       enjoying 
Relative obj.   puppies 
Spectator: 
Catalyst:         see Lillian and Walter together 
Objectivity:    Lillian and Walter 
Subjectivity:   Lillian is happy 
Perception:     enjoying 
Response:       unsure 
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22 
 
Walter:   
Catalyst:         see an opening 
Objectivity:     self 
Subjectivity:   I get what I want 
Perception:     smooth 
Response:       confident 
Lillian 
Catalyst:          sense Walter’s demeanor 
Walter:            Walter 
Subjectivity:    I enjoy life 
Perception:      charming 
Response:        attending 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
 
Spectator: 
Catalyst:           see intertitle 
Objectivity:      the story 
Subjectivity:     Lillian is happy 
Perception:       disturbing 
Response:         anticipating              
 
     
                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
Lillian 
Catalyst:        W: “Will you marry me?”  
Objectivity:   his question 
Subjectivity:  Everything is normal  
Perception:    unwanted 
Response:      shocked 
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25 
Lillian: 
Catalyst:        “Please”    
Objectivity:   marriage 
Subjectivity:  I enjoy life 
Perception:    unwanted 
Response:      displeased 
Relative obj.  Walter 
 
Spectator: 
Catalyst:         Walter’s proposal 
Objectivity:    marriage 
Subjectivity:   I enjoy life 
Perception:     unwanted 
Response:       displeased 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
Lillian: 
Catalyst:         Walter’s insistence 
Objectivity:    Walter 
Subjectivity:   I enjoy life 
Perception:     unwanted 
Response:       resisting 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
Omniscient narrator: 
Catalyst:          Walter’s gesture 
Objectivity:     Walter 
Subjectivity:    Lillian is happy 
Perception:      faking 
Spectator: 
Catalyst:          Walter’s gesture 
Subjectivity     Lillian is happy 
Objectivity:     Walter 
Perception:      faking 
Response:        disliking 
Lillian: 
Catalyst:         Walter’s gesture  
Objectivity:    Walter 
Subjectivity:   I enjoy life 
Perception:     upset 
Response:       unsure 
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28 
Lillian 
Catalyst:         his further gesture 
Objectivity:    Walter 
Subjectivity:   I’m a good person 
Perception:     hurt 
Response:       relenting 
Omniscient narrator 
Catalyst:         Lillian turns toward Walter 
Objectivity:    Lillian 
Subjectivity:   Lillian is happy 
Perception:     fooled 
Spectator:      see Lillian relent 
Objectivity:    Lillian  
Subjectivity:   I have a life 
Perception:     fooled 
Response:       curious 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
Lillian: 
Catalyst:        Walter’s expression  
Objectivity:   Walter 
Subjectivity:  I’m a good person 
Perception:    hurt 
Response:      accepting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
Lillian: 
Catalyst:        see Walter’s expression  
Objectivity:   Walter 
Subjectivity:  I’m a good person 
Perception:    happy 
Response:      pleased 
 
 
 
     The spectator can anticipate drama ahead.  
          Discussing André Bazin, Philip Rosen writes, “Bazin believes in the necessary co-
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existence of both “objective and “subjective aspects in the making and receiving/experiencing of 
films.”90 I believe the above indicates this ubiquitous co-existence.  
      Christian Metz has written, “One of the most important problems in film theory is that of 
the impression of reality experienced by the spectator…Films release a mechanism of affective 
and perceptual participation in the spectator… They spontaneously appeal to his sense of 
belief—never, of course, entirely, [but] they speak to us with the accents of true evidence, using 
the argument that "It is so."91   
     When a spectator exits a movie theatre, so taken with a character that she imitates her 
behavior, her behavior may be just that, an imitation, achieved with the intention to imitate. 
However, as has been shown, with the structure and process of relationship being the same in 
both the mental process and the cinematic process, the fusion of a spectator with a film is not 
superficial. With film, communication occurs on the level of consciousness itself, in the 
common language of consciousness. With no physical barriers, a film gains access to the mind 
of a willing spectator and the spectator becomes one with the film. Given that subjectivity is 
comprised of one’s values, and a spectator’s own subjectivity is essentially supplanted during a 
film, I argue that the replacement of spectator subjectivity with omniscient narrator subjectivity 
is a means through which film affects social change.  
      Several years before the year 1984, which is the title of George Orwell’s famous novel 
about a dystopian society in that year, the late actor, playwright and columnist Seth Allen said, 
                                                
90      Philip Rosen, “History of Image, Image of History: Subject and Ontology in Bazin,” in 
Rites of Realism: Essays on Corporeal Cinema, ed. Ivone Margulies (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2003). 44. 
91     Christian Metz, "On the Impression of Reality in the Cinema." In Christian Metz, Film 
Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema. Trans. Michael Taylor (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), 4. (emphasis in original) 
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“People think Big Brother’s going to be watching us, but instead it’ll be us watching Big 
Brother.”   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
                                                              A Rationale 
 
     It may be helpful to provide credibility to acting as the source of the discovery of the self-
organizing complex system discussed in this thesis, since the view that acting has any scientific 
validity is generally considered laughable. This view of acting goes back to the Greeks, as it 
derives from Plato’s Socratic dialogue, “Ion.” In this short work, Socrates questions Ion, a 
rhapsode, a performer of epic poetry, i.e., an actor, about his profession. Ion is depicted as vain 
and childlike in the dialogue, and through questioning is shown to know nothing about what he 
does (in the way that musicians and visual artists do), or about anything else. Socrates concludes 
that the emotions Ion conveys and his ability to inspire strong emotions in the audience are, like 
the poet, simply a matter of “divine inspiration.” With this, the dialogue has provided classical 
precedence for a dismissive view of acting.92 Thus, even actors and other theatre people have 
upheld this view. As Roland Barthes observed, “It is forbidden as a crime of lèse-essence to 
speak about the theatre scientifically: or rather, any intellectual way of viewing the theatre is 
discredited as scientism or pedantic language.”93 Yet here is a brief excerpt of what Plato also 
wrote: 
Socrates: The gift which you possess…is not an art, but, as I was just saying, an 
inspiration; there is a divinity moving you, like that contained in the stone which 
                                                
92      Toby Cole and Helen Kritch Chinoy, eds., Actors on Acting: The Theories, Techniques, and 
Practices of the World’s Great Actors, Told in Their Own Words (New York: Three Rivers 
Press, 1970), 6. 
93      Roland Barthes, Mythologies (Originally published 1957). Trans. Richard Howard and 
Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012), 268. 
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Euripides calls a magnet, but which is commonly known as the stone of Heraclea. This 
stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a similar power of attracting 
other rings; and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended 
from one another so as to form quite a long chain: and all of them derive their power of 
suspension from the original stone.  
      As I have said, it was the physics of what I experienced as an actor that inspired my 
investigation of acting.  The word “ion,” with the root meaning “to go” is the Greek word that 
Michael Faraday chose with the classicist William Whewell94 as the name for the 
electrochemical phenomena he discovered, coined because ions move toward the electrode of 
opposite charge.”95 Faraday discovered the operating principle of electromagnetic generators, 
which became the basis of electromagnetic field theory. I am not a professionally trained 
physicist, yet through the reverse engineering of an acting performance in which I experienced 
electromagnetic interactions, I inadvertently discovered how consciousness emerges from a 
hierarchal chain of unified fields. So while dismissing acting as a legitimate art form, Plato 
inadvertently gave it credibility in the context of physical science. Art will always be a mystery, 
in every art form. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
94      John Tyndall, Faraday As A Discover. Gutenberg Ebook. Chapter 6.  
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1225/1225-h/1225-h.htm 
95      Online Etymology Dictionary. 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=ion 
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